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16.1  Introduction 
Based on a new data set, this paper applies the generational accounting 
method (Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 1991) to assess the generational 
impact of current fiscal policies in Norway in terms of net lifetime tax burdens 
on present and future generations. 
Norway has a small population but is endowed with large natural resources. 
The country has been a producer of oil and natural gas since the 1970s and is 
now  the third largest exporter of oil in the world. More than 80 percent of 
Norway's petroleum revenues represent government income. Like the other 
Scandinavian countries, Norway is also a welfare state with a large public sec- 
tor and a fairly even distribution of income. Most transfers and welfare benefits 
are financed on a pay-as-you-go  basis. 
Both GDP and employment growth rates have been relatively high during 
the past 25 years. Most of the net employment growth can be accounted for by 
public sector employment, which has increased by 80 percent since 1970.' The 
labor force participation rate is also relatively high, and the rate of unemploy- 
ment has on average been quite low. Another remarkable fact is that the busi- 
ness cycles in Norway have been larger during the past 15 to 20 years than in 
the earlier postwar period, despite the automatic stabilizers built into the wel- 
fare system. Note, however, that both automatic stabilizers and countercyclical 
fiscal policy could bias the assessment of the long-mn generational impact of 
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1. At the same time, there has been a remarkable increase in the female participation rate from 
44.7 percent in 1972 to 64 percent in 1995 (percentage of those in the age group 16-74), 
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current fiscal policies because tax revenues, transfers, and other public spend- 
ing (e.g., on labor market programs) are sensitive to the business cycle and the 
short-run fiscal policy stance. 
The government has long-term fiscal challenges similar to those facing most 
other OECD countries, such as population aging and increased social security 
spending when the baby boom generations retire. What makes Norway differ- 
ent is the government’s considerable wealth in terms of oil, other energy re- 
sources, and net financial assets. The government now runs substantial budget 
surpluses. The temporary nature of the government’s oil revenues represents a 
special challenge for fiscal planning in addition to the usual problems high- 
lighted in the generational accounting literature.2 A natural way to deal with 
this problem is to include an estimate of the government’s petroleum resource 
wealth in the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Indeed, we think 
that the generational accounting method is a particularly useful tool for long- 
term fiscal planning and policy analysis in a resource-rich welfare state like 
Norway. 
The method of generational accounting was first applied in Norway for the 
year 1992 (see Auerbach et al. 1993). This was before the Norwegian economy 
had recovered from the recession of the late 1980s. Due to the recent recovery, 
fiscal policy has changed from an expansive policy in 1990-93 to a much more 
austere policy from 1994 onward. The generational accounting method was 
discussed and applied in the National Budget 1995 (released in October 1994), 
the annual economic policy document of the government. Since then, genera- 
tional accounting has been used by the government on a regular basis to assess 
the long-run fiscal balance.  The estimated  generational imbalance between 
present and future generations has been reduced remarkably compared with 
the first results reported by Auerbach et al. (1993). At the present, there is 
probably generational balance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 16.2 looks back on 
the recent history of the welfare state and fiscal policy in Norway and discusses 
the ideas behind the State Petroleum Fund, which was established in 1990 to 
prevent excessive spending of temporary petroleum revenues. In section 16.3, 
we give a brief description of the data underlying our projections of population, 
public expenditures and receipts, and government wealth. Section 16.4 reports 
new results from applying the generational accounting method with 1995 as 
the base year. Also some sensitivity analysis are reported. Section 16.5 ana- 
lyzes the impact of alternative policies that hypothetically could equalize the 
growth-adjusted  net tax burdens  of present  and future generations.  Section 
16.6 summarizes our results. 
2. For a recent study of this problem, see Steigum and Thagersen (1995). who simulate a com- 
putable overlapping generations model to illustrate the intergenerational welfare effects of con- 
suming the entire petroleum wealth in the course of  the next 40  years. 371  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
16.2  Fiscal Policy: Brief History and Present Challenges 
16.2.1  The Norwegian Welfare State 
The government now spends almost 30 percent of GDP on social protection 
in the form of various transfers to households, health care, labor market pro- 
grams, and so forth (see Risa 1996). In addition, the government’s  expenditures 
on education total 6.6 percent of  GDP. The public sector supplies most edu- 
cational and health services, including higher education. Consumers pay very 
little for these services. 
The Norwegian welfare state is of recent origin. In 1960, total government 
spending was 26.4 percent of GDP, which was slightly lower than the corre- 
sponding  number for the United  States. The universal and partly  earnings- 
related social security pension scheme was introduced in 1967 and is still ma- 
turing. The principle of universalism has been a characteristic of the Scandina- 
vian welfare states. For example, both child support and the old-age pension 
are universal benefits in Norway. Still, there is a trend away from universalism 
and toward more targeting in some areas. 
The expansion of welfare programs was particularly fast in the 1970s. For 
example, in 1978 Norway established one of the most generous sickness bene- 
fit schemes in the world, involving 100 percent compensation from day one. 
Government spending on several public assistance programs increased rapidly 
in the 1980s as well, notably disability pensions, sickness benefits, unemploy- 
ment benefits, lone parents’ allowances, and means-tested municipal economic 
assistance. This development has caused concern among policymakers. In the 
1990s, the government formulated a broad strategy to strengthen the economic 
foundation and sustainability of the welfare state. An important element of this 
strategy was the “working approach,” aimed at promoting employment and 
reducing welfare dependency. For example, measures have been taken to curb 
the  growth in  spending  on unemployment  benefits and  disability  pensions 
through various labor market programs designed to enhance human capital and 
increase labor force participation. In recent years, reforms to make the old-age 
pension system partially funded have also been discus~ed.~ 
16.2.2  Macroeconomic Planning and Fiscal Policy 
In the postwar period, economic policy thinking in Norway has been marked 
by a strong belief in macroeconomic planning and economic policy activism, 
beliefs and ideas that can be traced back to the intellectual influence of Nobel 
laureate  Ragnar Frisch  (1896-1973)  on  several  generations  of  Norwegian 
3. The implications of such reforms for intergenerational distribution of welfare have also been 
examined, using calibrated overlapping generations models of the Norwegian economy (see Stei- 
gum 1993; Raffelhiischen and Risa 1995). 372  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
Table 16.1  Net Saving Rates in Norway, Europe, and the United States (percent) 
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Source: Leibfritz et al. (1995, annex 5,  table A9). 
Nore: The definition of public saving captures neither increased social security debt nor changes 
in the government's petroleum wealth. 
aGermany,  France, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Swe- 
den. Weighted average (1991 GDP weights). 
 economist^.^  The  unique  Norwegian  system  of  macroeconomic  planning, 
which was developed in the 1950s and 1960s, may explain why the Norwegian 
capital market remained particularly underdeveloped for decades, until a long 
overdue financial deregulation policy was launched in the 1980s. Before the 
financial deregulation, real rates of interest were kept artificially low--after- 
tax rates even negative most of the time-private  saving was small, and credit 
rationing and liquidity constraints were widespread. In this institutional set- 
ting, fiscal policy was quite potent. 
An important fiscal policy goal was to generate enough saving to fulfill the 
government's ambitious goals with respect to capital accumulation and invest- 
ment allocation on sectors. The government therefore ran substantial surpluses 
during most of the postwar period. Table 16.1 highlights the important role of 
public saving. In the 1980s, government net saving (conventionally measured) 
was on average 7.6 percent of  GDP in Norway, and negative (on average) in 
Europe. 
16.2.3 
In the pre-oil period  1950-70,  the governments (mostly social democratic 
ones) were fairly  successful in managing the economy, at least in terms of 
macroeconomic stability.' After Norway became a producer of oil and natural 
Oil Revenues: A New Challenge for Fiscal Policy 
4.  Frisch also had very pessimistic views on the social benefits of decentralized resource alloca- 
5.  A likely social cost of the macroeconomic planning system was a low real rate of  return from 
tion through the market economy. 
domestic investment. 373  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
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Fig. 16.1  Production of oil and natural gas 
Note: See appendix table 16B.1 for data. 
gas, however, it turned out to be much harder to manage and stabilize the econ- 
omy. Norway’s macroeconomic problems after OPEC I in 1973-74  were how- 
ever of a different nature than the stagflationary problems of the oil-importing 
European countries: in Norway, the main problem after OPEC I was inflation- 
ary pressure from very fast growth of domestic aggregate demand. This was 
due to the positive wealth effect of  the oil price shock, a lenient macroeco- 
nomic policy to counteract the effects of  the international recession, and the 
aggregate demand effect of a very high rate of investment in the petroleum in- 
dustry. 
Figure 16.1 illustrates the rapid growth of petroleum production since 1975, 
as well as a projection of  petroleum production to 2030. The growth rate of 
petroleum production has been unexpectedly high during the past  10 years, 
partly because technological progress has been rapid. The production of  oil 
and natural gas is expected to peak shortly after 2000 and then decline in sub- 
sequent decades. 
The government’s net cash flow from the petroleum sector has been very 
volatile. It increased dramatically in  1980 due to OPEC  I1 and then fell to 
almost zero as a result of the oil price plunge in 1985-86.  Figure 16.2 shows 
the government’s projection of the net cash flow for the years 2001, 2010, and 
2030, as well as for some previous years. In the past 10 years, increased oil 
production as well as lower operating costs explain most of the remarkable 
growth of the government’s net cash flow from the petroleum sector. Increased 
production and a lower rate of investment are expected to increase the govern- 
ment’s net cash flow to 9 percent of GDP in the year 2001. From then on, the 
net cash flow is expected to decline. The projection of  the net cash flow in 
figure  16.2 is consistent with  the estimates of  the government’s petroleum 
wealth used in our calculations of generational accounts. 374  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
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Fig. 16.2  Projected government net income from petroleum sector and old-age 
and disability pensions 
Note:  See appendix table 16B.2 for data. 
Figure 16.2 also shows a rapid increase in the projected spending on social 
security pensions as a percentage of  GDP in the next century, due to demo- 
graphics as  well  as  the  maturing  process of  the  earnings-related pension 
scheme. The figure illustrates the expected decline in the importance of the net 
cash flow from the petroleum sector as a financial resource for the Norwegian 
welfare state in the future. Since neither changes in petroleum wealth nor so- 
cial security debt are captured by  the conventional budget surplus concept of 
the government, the latter is a particularly misleading indicator of  long-run 
fiscal balance in the case of Norway. 
16.2.4  Business Cycles and Fiscal Policy 
Both OPEC I and I1 had tremendous impacts on Norway’s economy. After 
OPEC I in 1973-74,  the fast growth of  aggregate demand and huge capital 
imports led to macroeconomic policy restraint that slowed down the growth in 
aggregate demand at the end of the decade. The combination of this policy and 
OPEC I1 had a very large effect on the external balance, which turned into 
large surpluses in the current account in the first half of the 1980s. Figure 16.3 
indicates that the Norwegian economy has been exposed to larger macroeco- 
nomic fluctuations after 1980 than before. This figure shows employment as 
well as the value added of mainland Norway, that is, GDP net of the petroleum 
industry and shipping. 
The large business cycle in the late 1980s can be traced back to the “credit 
boom” in the aftermath of the financial deregulation policy in 1984-85.6  This 
boom, together with the oil price shock in 1986 and the subsequent deteriora- 
tion of  the current account, triggered a countercyclical fiscal and monetary 
6. For a discussion of  the financial deregulation as well as the fiscal and monetary policy that 
fueled the credit boom in the 1980s, and the subsequent banking crisis, see Steigum (1992). 375  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
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Fig. 16.3  Aggregate employment and GDP for mainland Norway 
Nore: See appendix table 16B.3 for data. 
policy. The credit boom was followed by a quite deep and protracted recession, 
despite a shift in fiscal policy to boost consumer spending in the beginning 
of the 1990s. A new business cycle upturn began in 1993, and at present the 
Norwegian economy is again booming and indeed is running the risk of over- 
heating. 
The inflation in the 1970s and 1980s undermined the income tax system and 
gave rise to large tax wedges in labor and capital markets. In addition to exces- 
sive marginal  tax rates  on labor income,  the combination  of  inflation  and 
unlimited tax deductions of nominal borrowing costs-as  well as the govern- 
ment’s regulation of nominal interest rates-led  to persistently negative after- 
tax real rates of interest. Marginal tax rates were gradually reduced in the late 
1980s, however, and a tax reform was put into effect in 1992. The tax reform 
broadened the income tax base and reduced the statutory tax rate on nominal 
capital income to 28 percent, and the maximum marginal tax rate on labor 
income to 49.5 percent. In addition to its negative effects on economic effi- 
ciency and resource allocation, the former tax system also contributed to mac- 
roeconomic  instability, in particular by  excessively  stimulating spending  fi- 
nanced by credit. Both the volatile petroleum revenues of the government and 
its countercyclical fiscal policy have contributed to large cycles in the govern- 
ment’s budget surplus (see fig. 16.4). 
A comparison of figures 16.2 and 16.4 shows quite clearly the influence of 
the petroleum cash flow on the government’s net investment in financial assets. 
For example, in the period  1981-85  the oil price was very high, leading to a 
rapid accumulation of government financial assets. When we control for petro- 
leum revenues, however, the government’s budget surplus is also very sensitive 
to the business cycle. During the recessionary period 1988-92,  falling tax reve- 
nues as well as increased spending on unemployment benefits and labor market 376  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
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programs had a very strong impact on the overall budget balance (see fig. 16.4). 
Correspondingly, strong employment growth and declining unemployment in 
recent years have contributed to a remarkable improvement in the budget bal- 
ance. The surprising cyclical instability of the Norwegian economy during the 
past 15 to 20 years explains why most of the focus of  fiscal policy has been 
on macroeconomic ~tability.~  Still, in recent years there has also been greater 
awareness of the uncertainties surrounding the government’s future petroleum 
revenues as well as the projected increase in social security pensions and other 
welfare spending beyond the year 2010, as illustrated in figure 16.2.8 
16.2.5  The State Petroleum Fund 
The large fluctuations in the government’s petroleum revenues since the late 
1970s have to some extent been absorbed by changes in the government’s stock 
of net financial assets (see figs. 16.2 and 16.4). Still, there has been a growing 
awareness  of  the  danger that  the temporary  oil revenues  will  be  spent too 
quickly. This concern is partly based on previous policy mistakes  and partly 
on the parliamentary situation in Norway, which leads mostly to minority gov- 
ernments. As in most other countries with large public sectors, Norwegian gov- 
ernments are exposed to strong pressure from many influential special interest 
groups dependent on subsidies, transfers, and other public spending. 
As an institutional response to political pressure to spend petroleum reve- 
nues quickly, the government established the State Petroleum Fund in  1990. 
7. In Norway as in most other small European countries, it is fiscal and not monetary policy 
that is considered most effective for  domestic macroeconomic stabilization. After the financial 
deregulation, monetary policy in Norway has been geared to stabilization of the exchange rate. 
8. This particular illustration first appeared in the government’s Long Term Programme in 1993 
and has been presented in several national budgets afterward. 377  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
Table 16.2  Norway's Demographic 'Itansition 
I995  2015  2050  2100 
Population (millions)  4.38  4.78  5.16  5.19 
Working age (%)  60.9  61.1  57.4  56.8 
Elderly (%)  15.9  17.2  22.2  23.1 
Elderly dependency ratio" (%)  26  29  40  41 
Source: Statistics Norway, Population Projections  1996-2050:  National and Regional Figures, 
NOS C HI4 (Oslo, 1997), and authors' calculations. 
The  ratio of those aged 65 or older to those aged 19 to 64. 
The goal of the fund is to avoid excessive spending of petroleum revenues and 
promote a gradual transformation of oil wealth into foreign assets. The fund is 
likely to make the government's decisions to spend or save petroleum revenues 
more visible. For example, according to the rules of the fund, it is not possible 
to increase the fund without a budget surplus of the central government. More- 
over, future budget deficits will lead to a corresponding decline in the size of 
the fund. This prevents the creation of an "artificial" fund financed by public 
borrowing. The year 1995 was the first in which the government ran a budget 
surplus since the State Petroleum Fund was formally established. Investment 
in the fund in 1995 was quite small, however; but in 1996 the size of the invest- 
ment is projected to reach 4.5 percent of GDP. According to the medium-term 
projection of the government's receipts and expenditures reported in the Nu- 
tionul  Budget 1997, the Petroleum Fund will grow rapidly in the rest of  the 
1990s. 
16.3  Data 
In this section we revise and update the description of the data sources in 
Auerbach et al. (1993). More details are given in appendix A. To form genera- 
tional accounts for current and future generations, we need (1) projections of 
the population by  age and sex, (2)  projections of average net taxes for each 
member of each generation in each year in which as least some of its members 
will be alive, (3) an estimate of the initial stock of government net wealth, and 
(4) projections of future government spending on goods and services that are 
not distributed on age groups. 
16.3.1  Population Projection 
The projection of population by age and sex from 1995 through 2200 has 
been provided by Statistics Norway. It builds on recent trends in fertility, mor- 
tality, and net immigration. In  1995, Norway's population was 4.38 million, 
and-as  in almost all OECD countries-the  population is on average getting 
older. Table 16.2 shows how this aging process will play out through the next 
century. The projections assume that the current fertility rate of  1.86 percent 378  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
Table 16.3  Public Expenditures and Receipts, 1995 (percent of GDP) 
Receipts 
Direct and indirect taxes and social security contributions 
Petroleum taxes 
Indirect taxes, mainland Norway 
Direct taxes and social security contributions, mainland Norway 
Income from capital and wealth 
Total receipts 
Expenditures 


















Source: National Budget I997 
will prevail in future years, and that life expectancy at birth will continue to 
increase, leading to an expected life span of 80 years for males and 84.5 years 
for females by 2050. The annual net flow of immigrants is assumed to be 7,000 
individuals (0.16 percent of total population in 1995). The percentage of Nor- 
wegians over age 65 is now  15.9, but by 2050 that figure should hit 22.2. The 
elderly dependency ratio of 0.26, already quite high, is expected to increase 
sharply after 2015, reaching 0.40 by the year 2050. 
16.3.2  Public Expenditures and Receipts 
Our projections of  average future taxes and transfers by  age and sex begin 
with the 1995 official totals for all levels of government. Table 16.3 shows the 
principal components of  the Norwegian government’s expenditures and re- 
ceipts in 1995 (both central and local government), based on national accounts 
definitions. The 1995 budget surplus was positive, 3.5 percent of  GDP, after 
several years of  deficits. Looking first at the receipts, we see from table 16.3 
that indirect taxes amount to 15.4 percent of GDP. The value-added tax rate is 
now  23 percent. In  addition, there are substantial consumption taxes (excise 
taxes) on cars, gasoline, alcohol, tobacco, and some other commodities. Ex- 
cluding petroleum taxes, direct taxes and social security contributions repre- 
sent 24.2 percent of  GDP, most of  which are taxes on labor income. Direct 
taxes on labor income are progressive. Social security contributions are partly 
a payroll tax and partly a direct tax on labor income. There is full tax deduct- 
ibility of nominal borrowing costs. Traditionally, households have been heavily 
indebted. The net tax revenues from capital income have therefore been small 
and even negative. There is also a progressive wealth tax that may have signifi- 
cant adverse incentive effects on private saving. Property taxes are a minor 379  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Noway 
item. Because the Norwegian government’s wealth is huge, income from cap- 
ital and wealth is large, 8.6 percent of  GDP. This number does not include 
petroleum taxes, however. On the other hand, interest on the government’s debt 
(2.9 percent of GDP) is not deducted; see the last item under “expenditures.” 
The government in Norway is an important financial intermediary, channeling 
loans through  special government financial institutions, called state banks, 
funded through government bond issues. The gross debt of the government was 
42 percent of GDP in 1995. Still the government has positive net financial as- 
sets. 
Turning to the government expenditures in table 16.3, we see that transfers 
total 22.0 percent of GDP. Subsidies, primarily agricultural, represent 4.0 per- 
cent. In 1995,  public expenditures on social security pensions (old-age and dis- 
ability pensions) amounted to 8 percent of  GDP. Social security spending is 
expected to grow rapidly in the future (see fig. 16.2). Public consumption rep- 
resented 20.7 percent of GDP in 1995. About 31 percent of total employment 
is in the public sector, including education and health care organized by  local 
governments. In 1995, public spending on education and health amounted to 
6.6 and 6.4 percent of  GDP, respectively. To calculate generational accounts, 
it is assumed that  net  per capita general government spending (not distri- 
buted on age groups as transfers) keeps in line with the productivity growth 
rate. 
16.3.3  Taxes and Transfers 
To construct age profiles, taxes are categorized as value-added taxes (VAT), 
auto excise and gasoline taxes, as well as alcohol, tobacco, and some other ex- 
cise taxes (EX), social security contributions (SST), and income taxes (YTX), 
which also include the wealth tax. In table 16.4, the 1995 per capita value of 
each category, distributed by  sex, are pre~ented.~  Observe that SST and YTX 
exclude taxes on pension income paid by retirees. Correspondingly, pensions 
are defined as after-tax pensions. Military service is mandatory for males in 
Norway. We have not, however, tried to estimate the implicit tax on males (and 
the corresponding addition to expenditures on defense). 
The two far most important tax categories are YTX and SST. On a per capita 
basis, each Norwegian pays $3,461 in income and other direct taxes (not count- 
ing direct income taxes from pensions) and $3,320 in social security contribu- 
tions (including payroll taxes). The third largest category is VAT  ($2,086). 
Males pay  more direct taxes and social security contributions than females, 
who generally have lower participation rates, more part-time work, and lower 
hourly compensation. Also, the progressive nature of direct income taxes con- 
9. %o  minor simplifications have been done in the accounts since the first report by Auerbach 
et al. (1993). In the present version we do not estimate separate time profiles for alcohol and 
tobacco excise taxes or for the wealth tax. 380  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
Table 16.4  Taxes and Transfers and Public Expenditures Related to Age Groups, 
1995 (US.  dollars per capita) 
Males  Females 
Taxes 
Value-added taxes (VAT)  1,035  1,05  1 
Auto, gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol taxes (EX)  702  713 
Social security contributions (SST)  2,133  1,187 
Income taxes and other direct taxes (YTX)  2,398  1,063 
Sum taxes  6,268  4,014 
Transfers and Expenditures Related to Age Groups 
Transfers 
Old-age pensions, after direct tax (PEN)  908  1,117 
Disability pensions (DIS)  373  348 
Sickness allowance (SIK)  256  362 
Family allowance (FAM)  13  406 
Unemployment (UNM)  343  230 
Other social security benefits (OTH)  436  600 
Sum transfers  2,329  3,063 
Expenditures 
Old-age support (OLD) 
Health benefits (HOS) 
Education (EDU) 
254  439 
374  581 
1,086  1,105 
Sum expenditures  1,714  2,125 
Sum transfers and expenditures  4,043  5,188 
Net Tares 
Net taxes  2,225  -1,174 



















1,05  I 
3,242 
Sources; Various data sources, see appendix A. 
Note: The numbers in all three columns are aggregates divided by  the entire population (4.38 
million). 
tributes to the large gender difference in tax payments. Existing data do not 
permit a distribution of  VAT  and other indirect taxes by  sex. Individual tax 
payments of VAT  and EX for each age cohort are therefore assumed to be the 
same for males and females. 
Due to data limitations, there are tax categories that we have not distributed 
by age and sex, in particular corporate taxes and VAT  paid by  firms and the 
public sector itself. Neither are petroleum taxes and taxes paid by hydroelectric 
power companies included in table 16.4.  This is due to the fact that we capital- 
ize the petroleum and hydroelectric power wealth owned by the government 
and define these as part of total government wealth (see below). In our calcula- 
tions of  generational  accounts,  the  petroleum  and energy  taxes referred  to 
above are therefore accounted for by the rate of return on government wealth. 
In the Norwegian generational accounts, government expenditures on edu- 381  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
cation and some categories of public spending on health and public services to 
retirees are treated in the same way as transfers to specific age cohorts. Transfer 
payments distributed by  age and sex are categorized as direct old-age-related 
spending (old-age support, OLD), spending on  health benefits that  can be 
traced to age groups (HOS), education (EDU), old-age pensions (PEN; after 
tax, but including survivors’ pensions), disability pensions (DIS), sickness and 
childbirth benefits (SIK), universal child support (FAM), unemployment ben- 
efits and  labor market programs (UNM), and other social security benefits 
(OTH).I0  The per capita values of these categories are also shown in table 16.4. 
The most important transfer category is PEN, but EDU is very important too. 
In the generational accounts of  some countries, educational spending by  the 
government is not treated as transfers. Since the label of this spending category 
makes a lot of difference to the accounts, we also present calculations of gener- 
ational accounts without distributing EDU by  age. The other quantitatively 
important transfer categories are DIS, SIK, FAM, and UNM. The social secu- 
rity system in Norway does not have a general early retirement scheme, and 
the normal retirement age is 67 years. As  a consequence, many  individuals 
above age 60 (particularly males) receive disability pensions and sickness ben- 
efits. In  addition to unemployment benefits, a  substantial part  of  UNM  is 
spending on labor market programs. 
Looking at the distribution of transfers by  sex, females have a larger share 
than males for most categories, the main exception being UNM. Even though 
the pension scheme is partly earnings related, it gives more transfers to females 
in the aggregate, due to their longer life expectancy. 
Table 16.4 also shows per capita net taxes, which are only $2,225 for males 
and -$1,174  for females, in sum $1,05  1. The latter is a very low number com- 
pared to the gross per capita taxes in table 16.4, and it illustrates the importance 
of  welfare spending in Norway. The size of  the net tax  is very sensitive to 
whether we label public educational spending as transfers or general govern- 
ment spending. In the latter case, the net per capita tax increases to $3,3 11 for 
males and -$69  for females, in total $3,242 (see table 16.4). 
16.3.4  Government Wealth 
Our measure of  government net  wealth is the sum of  four components: 
(1) petroleum wealth, (2) hydroelectric power wealth, (3) shares and equity 
capital, and (4) other financial assets (net). Existing data on public wealth are 
incomplete and generally not based on market values. Our calculations of gen- 
erational accounts depart from the conventional definition of wealth in the na- 
tional accounts, primarily because we include natural resource wealth. Since 
Norway’s petroleum wealth is not marked to market, the petroleum wealth esti- 
mate is calculated as the present value of expected net future cash flow to the 
10. Other social security benefits include among other things rehabilitation benefits and lone 
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government.Il In our estimate, future oil prices have been adjusted for risk. The 
generational accounts presented in tables 16.5 through  16.9 are based on the 
petroleum wealth estimate in the NutionuE Budget 1997 (released in October 
1996), which was 124 percent of GDP (5 percent real rate of interest). In Feb- 
ruary 1997 the government’s estimate of the future time path of oil production 
was revised upward to a considerable extent, increasing the former petroleum 
wealth estimate by  29 percent. We  shall return to how the revised petroleum 
wealth affects our results below. 
16.4  Basic Findings and Sensitivity Analysis 
16.4.1  Basic Findings 
Table  16.5 presents the generational accounts for all present  and future 
generations in 1995 under the base-case assumptions (real rate of interest, 5 
percent; productivity growth rate, 1.5 percent). The accounts are the present 
values of the sum of  net taxes over the expected remaining lifetime of each 
generation, assuming that the fiscal policy rules in  1995 apply to all present 
generations (the 1995 cohort and all older cohorts). Following the generational 
accounting methodology explained in Auerbach et al. (1991, 1993), the aver- 
age (growth-adjusted)  account for future generations is calculated as a residual 
from the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. 
Comparing the first and last rows of  the last column, we  see that future 
generations face a net lifetime tax burden exceeding the account for newborns 
in 1995 by  about $55,900. It is not meaningful to use the percentage difference 
as a measure of  intergenerational tax burden shifting, however, because the 
average account for newborns in  1995 is close to zero, only $1,400. The low 
value of the newborns’ account is due to the fact that we distribute government 
educational spending on age groups. For the 5-year-old cohort, the account is 
even  negative. For older generations in  1995 the  accounts become larger, 
reaching a maximum of about $130,000 for 30-year-olds. The average account 
turns negative for those who are 50 years old in 1995, hitting a minimum for 
the 70-year-old generation, amounting to about -$180,000. 
The gender difference in table 16.5 is significant. The average accounts for 
newborn boys and girls in 1995 differ by  about $170,000. The maximum dif- 
ference between males and females occurs for 25-year-olds. Then the average 
account for males is $248,500 and for females only $1,400. For generations 
older than 60 years, the difference is much smaller. The gender difference can 
be understood by  looking at the more detailed information presented in table 
16.6, which splits the base-case results into components of payments and re- 
1 I. Our method does not deal explicitly with the problem of cash-flow risk, which is substantial 
in the case of petroleum cash flow. Moreover, since the government is not able to diversify away 
the risk, the precautionary savings motive could be important for Norwegian fiscal policy. This is 
not captured by the concept of  fiscal balance in the present paper. 383  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
Table 16.5  Accounts for All Present and Future Generations: Base Case 
(thousands of US.  dollars) 
Generation's 
Age in 1995 
Weighted 
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-  163.2 
-  150.9 
-131.1 
-  115.8 













-  106.0 
-  145.5 
-184.1 
-  194.0 
-  184.1 
-  169.7 
-  150.9 
-  130.5 













-  135.3 
-  170.6 
-  179.6 
-  170.0 
-  155.1 
-  139.4 
-  122.6 
-96.1 
57.3 
Notes: Only the accounts for one-fifth of the present generations are shown. Government spending 
on education is distributed on age groups. Productivity growth rate assumed to be 1.5 percent; real 
rate of return, 5 percent; exchange rate, 6.33 kroner per US. dollar. 
'All  future newborn generations have the same growth-adjusted account. 
ceipts for males and females. Comparing the upper and lower parts of table 
16.6,  we see that males pay much more in social security taxes (SST) and direct 
income taxes (YTX) over their lifetimes than females. This is due to lower 
labor force participation, lower average working hours, and the lower average 
hourly wage for women than men. In addition, women receive higher lifetime 
benefits than men, particularly universal child support (FAM),'* sickness and 
childbirth benefits (SIK), and health benefits (HOS). Both the higher health 
benefits and the higher present values of women's pensions (PEN) are mainly 
due to women's greater longevity. 
Looking more closely at the various transfers from the government, the two 
12. For simplicity, universal child support has been  included in the accounts of  the parents 
(mostly mothers). We could alternatively have distributed these benefits on their children, in which 
case the gender difference in the accounts of newborns would have been reduced by approximately 
$20,000,  i.e., about  14 percent. On the other hand, the gender difference would probably have 
been much larger if the implicit military service tax on males had been accounted for. Table 16.6  Composition of Accounts for All Present Generations: Base Case (present value of receipts and payments in thousands of 
U.S. dollars) 
Payment  Receipts 
Generation’s  Net 



























-  124.5 
-  163.2 
-131.1 
-  101 .o 
-65.8 
-80.2 




-  145.5 
-  194.0 
-  169.7 


















































































6.7  14.9 
9.6  18.1 
12.4  20.8 
15.2  22.3 
19.7  25.1 
25.7  26.3 
34.4  21.0 
45.3  20.8 
62.4  8.0 
70.1  4.5 
Females 
9.8  23.4 
12.8  30.8 
16.6  37.1 
20.6  32.2 
27.3  29.5 
36.4  30.7 
49.9  33.6 
65.3  30.6 
82.8  17.2 













































































































































Nores: Only the accounts for one-tenth of  the present generations are shown. Government spending on education is distributed on age groups. Productivity growth 
rate assumed to be 1.5 percent; real rate of  return, 5 percent; exchange rate, 6.33 kroner per U.S. dollar. 385  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
most important are education (EDU) for the youngest cohorts and pensions 
(PEN) for the oldest. Since the average present value of education is more than 
$100,000 at birth, it makes an enormous difference to the accounts for new- 
borns whether educational spending is treated as a transfer or not. For the old 
cohorts, various old-age benefits (OLD) supplied by local governments are also 
very important for the generational accounts in addition to social security pen- 
sions. 
16.4.2  Sensitivity to Alternative Assumptions 
Table 16.7 shows the results of sensitivity tests with respect to the growth 
and real interest rates. The accounts of present and future generations (repre- 
sented by  newborn cohorts) have  been calculated for nine combinations of 
growth and interest rate assumptions. In panel A of  table  16.7, educational 
spending has been treated as age-specific transfers just as in tables 16.5 and 
16.6. In panel B government spending on education is not treated as a transfer 
but is included in general government spending. It is hard to judge the interest 
rate sensitivity of  intergenerational tax shifting just from the present values 
themselves. In panel A, for example, the lifetime net tax burdens of both pres- 
ent and future generations decrease when the interest rate increases, and be- 
cause the former are either very small or negative, it is not meaningful to com- 
pute relative differences. For the same reason, it is also difficult to evaluate 
how the three different assumptions of growth rates affect our results just by 
looking at panel A of table 16.7. We therefore turn to panel B. 
Panel B of table 16.7 reports the results when government spending on edu- 
cation is not treated as age-specific transfers. This change in labeling alters the 
definition of “net tax” and increases the size of net taxes for all cohorts who 
receive subsidized education. To explain how this will change the results, ob- 
serve that if the age-group distribution of the population is stationary, present 
and future aggregate government spending will not be altered by the new label- 
ing. Therefore, the difference between the accounts of future and present gen- 
erations will not change as a result of the new labeling of educational spending. 
In other words, since fiscal policy does not change, the intergenerational tax 
shifting must be the same. Note, however, that it is the difference in terms of 
present values that will be invariant under a change in how educational spend- 
ing is labeled. Clearly, the relative difference (percentage change) will de- 
crease, since the new definition of net taxes in panel B involves (much) higher 
present values of lifetime net tax burdens for newborns than under the former 
(panel A) definition of net taxes. The relabeling explains almost all of the dra- 
matic fall in relative changes when we go from panel A to panel B in table 
16.7. For example, in the base case the relative change in the accounts falls 
from 4,018 percent in panel A to 60.7 percent in panel B. 
The distribution of age groups in the Norwegian population is not stationary 
over time, however. Due to population aging, the relative size of the young age 
groups will decrease over time. Since the projection of future general govern- Table 16.7  Sensitivity to Assumptions about Growth and Interest Rates: Accounts for Newborns in 1995 and Future Generations (thousands of 
U.S. dollars) 
g=l  g = 1.5  g=2 

















A. Education Distributed on Age Groups 
-2.5  -13.3  5.3  1.4 
22.1  -40.6  169.9  57.3 
24.6  -27.3  164.6  55.9 
-  -  3,082  4,018 
95.2  61.9  145.2  106.3 
128.8  40.4  327.8  173.5 
33.6  -21.5  182.6  67.2 
34.0  -35.0  121.8  60.7 
B. No Distribution  of Education on Age Groups 
-11.2 




























Note: g is productivity growth rate (percent); r is real rate of interest (percent). Exchange rate assumed to be 6.33 kroner per U.S. dollar. 
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ment spending (excluding all age-specific transfers) is linked to the develop- 
ment of the total population, the sum of future general spending and transfers 
will be slightly higher when educational spending is relabeled as general gov- 
ernment spending. This small change in future fiscal policy explains why the 
difference between the accounts of future and present generations is larger in 
panel B than in panel A of table  16.7 for each of  the nine combinations of 
growth and  interest  rates.  For example, in  the base  case the  difference  is 
$55,900 in panel A and $67,200 in panel B. This difference is due to the fact 
that projected future government spending is somewhat higher in the latter 
case. 
Returning to the question of interest rate and growth rate sensitivity, we can 
now look at how the relative change between the accounts of present and future 
generations varies in the nine cases in table 16.7 (panel B). Clearly, we see that 
in this sense our results are indeed very sensitive to the choice of an interest 
rate. For example, the 60.7 percent difference in net lifetime tax burdens be- 
tween present and future generations in the base case increases to 121.8 per- 
cent when the rate of interest is 3 percent instead of  5, and it drops to 2.6 
percent when the interest rate is 7 percent. Likewise, if the growth rate is 1 
percent instead of 1.5 (and the interest rate is 5 percent), the relative difference 
in generational accounts drops from 60.7 to 34 percent, and if the growth rate 
is 2 percent, the relative difference increases to 82.9 percent. An important 
factor behind the interest rate sensitivity is the large wealth of the Norwegian 
government. A high real rate of  interest implies high capital income to the 
government, counteracting any shifting of tax burdens from present to future 
generations. In countries where the government is heavily indebted (e.g., Italy), 
introducing a higher real rate of interest therefore has the opposite intergenera- 
tional effect, increasing the tax burdens of future generations relative to the tax 
burdens of the present. 
The large wealth of the government can also explain the positive relation in 
table 16.7 between the growth rate and the relative difference between the ac- 
counts for future and present generations. For a given real rate of interest, a 
higher growth rate warrants a permanently higher budget surplus to keep the 
share of  capital  income in  total  government  income  constant.  Of  course, 
changes in growth and interest rates have other effects on intergenerational tax 
shifting  besides  those  stemming from  the  large  income from  government 
wealth, but due to the size of the latter, it is likely that the changes in capital 
income have a dominant impact on the sensitivity results reported in table 16.7. 
Table 16.8 shows the results of some further sensitivity analysis. The first 
alternative, in column (2), takes into account the medium-term “technical” pro- 
jection of government expenditures to 2000 reported in the National Budget 
1997. The medium-term projection assumes a soft landing of the Norwegian 
economy from the present boom as well as low growth of government spend- 
ing to keep wages and prices from accelerating. Government spending on un- 
employment benefits and labor market programs is assumed to decrease due to 388  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
Table 16.8  Sensitivity to Alternative Assumptions:  Accounts for Newborns in 1995 and 
Future Generations (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Medium-  No  Zero Net  50% Reduction 
Base  Term  Demographic  Financial  in Petroleum 
Case  Projectiona  Change  Assets  Wealth 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Present generations  1.4  7.7  14.3  1.4  1.4 
Future generations  51.3  35.1  1.2  66.2  112.4 




(% of  GDP)  -  1.9  -0.95  +0.5  -2.2  -3.8 
Notes; Government spending on education is distributed on age groups. Productivity growth rate assumed 
to be 1.5 percent; real rate of  return, 5 percent; exchange rate, 6.33 kroner per U.S.  dollar. 
”A  “technical” projection of the government’s budget to 2000, reported in the Nurional Budget 1997. 
expected lower unemployment. The fiscal policy is therefore tighter than in 
the base-case calculations, decreasing the accounts for future generations. The 
difference between the accounts for future and present generations decreases 
from $55,900 in the base case to $27,400, reducing the necessary spending cut 
to equalize net lifetime tax burdens from 1.9 percent of GDP in the base case 
to 0.95 percent. 
Column (3) in  table  16.8 summarizes the results of  a counterfactual  ex- 
periment in which the future demographic structure is identical to the present 
structure. This leads to slightly lower accounts for future generations than for 
present newborns. In this sense, population aging “explains” the entire genera- 
tional imbalance in the base case. Column (4) looks at what happens if the net 
financial assets of the government in 1995 are removed from the accounts. The 
increase in intergenerational tax shifting is $8,900 in terms of increased present 
value of net lifetime taxes on future generations, requiring a spending cut of 
2.2 percent of GDP to equalize the net tax burdens. 
Column (5) of table 16.8 summarizes the results when the petroleum wealth 
of the government is reduced by 50 percent. This is not a very unlikely shock. 
For example, the oil price shock in the winter of  1985-86  more than halved 
the petroleum wealth between 1985 and 1986. Table 16.8 shows that the inter- 
generational impact is huge, increasing the necessary spending cut to equalize 
burdens from 1.9 percent of GDP in the base case to 3.8 percent of GDP. 
In section 16.3 we reported the recent increase in the petroleum wealth esti- 
mate due to higher expected oil production in the future. Adopting the new 
petroleum wealth, the necessary spending cut to equalize the net tax burdens 
of present and future newborns is reduced from 1.9 to 0.8 percent of GDP. 389  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
16.5  The Generational Impact of Alternative Policies 
In section 16.4, we showed that a permanent spending cut amounting to 1.9 
percent of GDP would restore the generational accounts of newborns and fu- 
ture Norwegians to fiscal balance in the sense that the growth-adjusted present 
value of  net lifetime taxes of future newborns is brought in line with the ac- 
count of the 1995 newborns in the base case (see table 16.8).13  In this section, 
we discuss the effects on present generations of increasing taxes or reducing 
pensions to restore long-run fiscal balance. The following three alternatives 
will be considered: (1) an increase in VAT  revenues by  1.8 percent of  GDP, 
(2) an increase in direct income tax revenues (YTX) by  1.8 percent of  GDP, 
and (3) a cut in social security pensions (PEN) by  1.3 percent of GDP. Alterna- 
tive 1 involves an increase in the VAT  rate from 23 to 27.6 percent, and alterna- 
tive 2 corresponds to an increase in direct taxes from 24.1 to 27.9 percent of 
total wage income. Finally, the reduction in PEN amounts to a cut in after-tax 
pensions by 24.3 percent. Table  16.9 shows the effects of the three alternative 
policies. 
In the case of increased VAT, we see that an increase of the growth-adjusted 
account for newborns in 1995 to $18,500 is sufficient to obtain full long-run 
fiscal balance. Increasing YTX to achieve fiscal balance, involves a slightly 
lower account for both present and future newborns ($13,700), and reducing 
PEN leads to an even lower account for present and future newborns ($6,800). 
Considering how different generations living in 1995 are affected, the cut in 
pensions has a much larger effect on those over 50 years old than the corre- 
sponding increases in VAT  and YTX in table 16.9. For a 70-year-old individual 
in  1995, for example, the present value of  net taxes will be $38,000 higher 
than in the base case, and more than $30,000 higher than under the two alterna- 
tive policies in table 16.9. This of  course benefits the younger generations in 
1995 as well as all future generations, if the alternatives are increases in VAT 
or YTX. Such cuts in current pensions are, however, politically very unlikely. 
For example, in  1992 the rules of  the earnings-related pension system were 
changed, affecting only pensions far in the future. Taken in isolation, this pol- 
icy change probably increased the imbalance between the net tax burdens of 
present and future generations. A more likely future reform, however, is to 
remove some exclusive tax benefits for retired individuals, benefits that were 
introduced before the social security reform in 1967. 
There are also some minor differences between increasing VAT  and YTX to 
achieve fiscal balance. The increase in direct taxes will affect those 15 to 60 
years old somewhat more than it will the youngest and oldest age cohorts. In 
the past it appears to have been easier for Norwegian politicians to increase 
13. In the autumn of 1998, the oil price fell to half of its average 1997 level. This new informa- 
tion has not been taken into consideration in tables 16.5 through 16.9. 390  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
Table 16.9  Eliminating the Generational Imbalance: Accounts for All Present 
and Future Generations (thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Increasing  Increasing  Reducing 
Generation’s  VAT by  YTX by  PEN by 


































-  135.3 
-  170.6 
-  179.6 
-  170.0 
-155.1 
-  139.4 















-  126.3 
-  163.6 
-  174.3 
-  165.9 
-152.1 
-  137.2 














-  127.5 
-166.1 
-  177.4 
-  168.7 
-  154.4 
-  139.0 















-  130.8 
-141.6 
-  138.8 
-  132.1 
-  123.0 
-111.1 
-88.7 
Notes: Government spending on education is distributed on age groups. Productivity growth rate 
assumed to be 1.5 percent; real rate of return, 5 percent; exchange rate, 6.33 kroner per U.S. dollar. 
the VAT  rate and other indirect taxes than direct taxes on labor and capital. The 
VAT  rate was increased from 20 to 23 percent in the early 1990s. Norway also 
has the future option of  broadening the VAT  base to include services in the 
same manner as Sweden did some years ago. 
It is worth emphasizing that the estimated size of the generational imbalance 
is much smaller in the present paper than in Auerbach et al. (1993).  As we saw 
in section 16.4 above, it is also very sensitive to the projected real interest rate 
and the rate of productivity growth. 
16.6  Conclusions 
As a consequence of the government’s large petroleum revenues, as well as 
of the expected increase in pensions and other welfare spending due to popula- 
tion aging, the government’s budget surplus is quite misleading as an indicator 
of  long-run fiscal balance. In  a country like Norway, therefore, generational 
accounting appears to be a particularly useful method to assess the genera- 
tional impact of current fiscal policy. 
Adopting the base-case assumptions, the estimated imbalance in net tax bur- 391  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
dens between future generations and present newborns in  1995 is relatively 
small. For example, a permanent spending cut of  1.9 percent of  GDP would 
be sufficient to restore long-run fiscal balance in the sense that the growth- 
adjusted present value of net lifetime taxes of future newborns is reduced and 
brought  in line with the  account  for the  1995 newborns.  If  we  adopt  the 
medium-term projections of public spending and taxes in the National Budget 
1997, the corresponding spending cut to achieve long-run fiscal balance is re- 
duced to 1 percent of GDP. Also the recent increase in the petroleum wealth 
estimate reduces the generational imbalance significantly. We considered three 
different policies that would also restore long-run fiscal balance in the sense 
explained above. These were an increase in VAT revenues, an increase in direct 
income taxes, and a cut in pensions. The generational imbalance in  1995 is 
much smaller than in a previous study based on 1992 data. This is due both to 
the strong recent business cycle upturn and to a shift to a more austere fiscal 
policy. Using the most recent information on the government’s wealth and its 
fiscal policy for 1997, there is probably generational balance in 1997. 
In addition to the sensitivity to the present business cycle, our results are 
sensitive to the choice of assumptions about future rates of interest and produc- 
tivity growth. If the real interest rate is lower than the base-case assumption of 
5 percent, the generational imbalance increases. The interest rate sensitivity is 
mainly a consequence of the large public petroleum wealth, because a higher 
real rate of interest will increase permanent  income. We also looked at the 
effects of a reduction in petroleum wealth by 50 percent. Adopting the base- 
case assumptions, such a reduction would increase the necessary spending cut 
to achieve long-run fiscal balance from 1.9 to 3.8 percent of GDP. The govern- 
ment’s considerable exposure to oil price risk therefore represents an additional 
element of uncertainty in our assessment of the generational impact of current 




We distribute the 1995 totals of each tax and transfer by age and sex based 
on corresponding distributions in cross-sectional survey data. Age and sex pro- 
files for SST, YTX, WTX, PEN, DIS, SIK, FAM, UNM, and OTH are all 
constructed on the basis of the 1994 Income and Wealth Survey, which con- 
tains cross-sectional information on 41,112 individuals (1 percent of the popu- 
lation). Individual tax returns are linked to the data collected by  the survey. 
The estimated age profiles were smoothed, using a seven-period moving aver- 
age, with weights reflecting the number of observations in each age group. 
Due to the future maturing of the old-age pension scheme, the estimated age 392  Erling Steigum, Jr., and Carl Gjersem 
profiles from cross-sectional data will drift upward over time. To account for 
the expected average growth in future per capita old-age pensions, we use esti- 
mates provided by the microsimulation model MOSART developed by Statis- 
tics Norway. 
Our age-sex profile for VAT is estimated from the 1990  Survey of Consumer 
Expenditures. This is a survey of  1,201 households containing 3,216 individu- 
als. In distributing household consumption, we assumed that each child under 
age 17 consumed 70 percent  of  what adults consume. Various excise  taxes 
on gasoline and cars, as well as excises on tobacco, beer, and other alcoholic 
drinks are aggregated into one single age profile based on the 1990 Survey of 
Consumer Expenditures, corresponding to EX in table 16.4. 
For education (EDU), we adopted coverage rates and costs per student of 
various educational institutions based on public education statistics. While the 
age and sex profiles for primary and secondary education are quite accurate, 
we had to resort to a subjective estimate of profiles for college education. 
Due to incomplete and missing data, most public health  expenditures are 
not distributed by  age and  sex. The OLD category in table  16.4 represents 
public spending on old-age homes, wards, and dwellings; home nursing and 
assistance; and other public support to retirees living in their own homes. This 
profile is based  on the MAKKO m0de1.l~  The age profile of  public hospital 
services (HOS) has been constructed using coverage rates and average nursing 
time data from public hospital statistics. 
Government Wealth 
The petroleum wealth estimate is calculated as the present value of expected 
net future cash flow to the government, assuming a given time path of oil prices 
and field-specific natural gas prices, investment outlays, and production costs, 
as well as a projection of the future speed of reserve depletion (source: Minis- 
try of Finance). The revenues are both petroleum taxes paid by the oil compa- 
nies and capital income from the government’s ownership of oil and gas fields 
in the North Sea. Since future oil prices, production costs, reserves, and other 
factors are highly uncertain, estimates of petroleum wealth are very sensitive 
to assumptions. When performing sensitivity analyses, the wealth estimate as 
well as the permanent petroleum income will depend on the chosen real rate 
of interest. 
Hydroelectric power wealth has also been estimated as a present value of a 
projection of future public revenues from this sector. Due to incomplete data, 
the estimate is very crude. The estimated value of shares and equity capital 
owned by the government has been provided by the Ministry of Finance. An- 
other important asset is the public telephone company. Its value is estimated 
simply on the basis of a crude net cash-flow estimate. We have not attempted 
to estimate the values of other public enterprises. 
14. MAKKO has also been developed by Statistics Norway. 393  Generational Accounting and Depletable Natural Resources: Norway 
Appendix B 
Table 16B.1  Production of Oil and Natural Gas 
Production Estimate  Production Estimate  Production Estimate 
(million standard m3  (million standard m3  (million standard m3 
Year  oil equivalents)  Year  oil equivalents)  Year  oil equivalents) 
1972  1.9  1992  153.2  201 2  219.9 
1973  1.9  1993  160.8  2013  209.4 
1974  2.0  1994  180.3  2014  205.2 
1975  11.0  1995  193.4  2015  193.9 
1976  16.2  1996  222.4  2016  190.7 
1977  19.3  1997  238.7  2017  182.2 
1978  34.9  I998  260.6  2018  173.9 
1979  43.9  1999  272.0  2019  165.9 
1980  55.0  2000  279.5  2020  159.1 
1981  53.9  200 1  292.3  202 1  154.0 
1982  54.1  2002  287.3  2022  149.2 
1983  61.1  2003  281.4  2023  144.7 
1984  68.8  2004  260.6  2024  140.5 
1985  72.9  2005  247.4  2025  136.5 
1986  77.5  2006  242.7  2026  132.9 
1987  87.9  2007  241.4  2027  129.4 
1988  96.4  2008  239.3  2028  126.2 
1989  118.0  2009  236.2  2029  123.2 
1990  123.4  2010  233.7  2030  120.4 
1991  136.8  201 1  223.3 
Note: Numbers after 1995 are projections. 
Table 16B.2  Projected Government Net Income from Petroleum Sector and Old- 
Age and Disability Pensions (percent of GDP) 
Government Net  Old-age 
Year  Petroleum Sector  Pensions 
Income from  and Disability 
1973  0.1 
1980  5.95 
1991  5.17 
2001  9 
2010  11 
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Table 16B.3  Aggregate Employment and GDP for Mainland Norway (1972 = 1) 
GDP,  GDP, 
Mainland  Employed  Mainland  Employed 









































































Table 16B.4  Government Net Investment in Financial Assets 
Net Investment  Net Investment  Net Investment 



















5  1990  2 
4  1991  0 
4  1992  2 
7  1993  2 
10  1994  0 
6  1995  3 
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